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INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES IN A STRATEGIC SETTING: THE 3‐POINTS‐FOR‐A‐WIN SYSTEM IN SOCCER
Author(s) -
MOSCHINI GIANCARLO
Publication year - 2010
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00177.x
Subject(s) - incentive , exploit , economics , strategic complements , strategic interaction , point (geometry) , set (abstract data type) , microeconomics , empirical research , econometrics , computer science , mathematics , statistics , geometry , computer security , programming language
I exploit a major structural change that has occurred in world soccer to study the impact of incentives on outcomes in a strategic setting. A game‐theoretic model is developed that captures some essential strategic elements of soccer vis‐à‐vis the number of points awarded to a win. The observable implications of the model are tested using a large data set that spans 30 years and 35 countries. The empirical results support the theoretical model and show that the 3‐point system has led to a statistically significant increase in the expected number of goals and a decrease in the fractions of drawn matches. ( JEL C72, L83, C23)