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Reliant behavior in the United States and Japan
Author(s) -
Beard TR,
Jnr RO Beil,
Mataga Y
Publication year - 2001
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2001.tb00065.x
Subject(s) - interpersonal communication , welfare , economics , variance (accounting) , social psychology , simple (philosophy) , psychology , positive economics , political science , market economy , philosophy , accounting , epistemology
Japanese economic success is often attributed to culturally reinforced psychological conditioning that promotes interpersonal reliance, cooperation, and a group interest orientation. This article provides direct experimental evidence on differences in behavior among future business people in the United States and Japan. Utilizing a simple, two person extensive form game of perfect information introduced by Selten (1975), we provide evidence that, contrary to some views, the Japanese can be less reliant on the behavior of others and are more likely to take actions at variance with group welfare in some settings. Thus, popular explanations of Japanese economic achievements may require further exploration.