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RENT‐SEEKING FIRMS, CONSUMER GROUPS, AND THE SOCIAL COSTS OF MONOPOLY
Author(s) -
Baik Kyung Hwan
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1999.tb01447.x
Subject(s) - monopoly , rent seeking , economics , social cost , economic surplus , microeconomics , opportunity cost , public economics , market economy , welfare , politics , political science , law
Do consumers' consumer‐surplus (CS)–defending activities increase the social costs of monopoly compared to when consumers are inactive? Given just one rent‐seeking firm, consumers ' CS‐defending activities generally increase the social costs of monopoly, but given two or more rent‐seeking firms, such activities generally reduce the social costs. ( JEL D72, L12)