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LEVIATHAN AT BAY: CONSTITUTIONAL VERSUS POLITICAL CONTROLS ON GOVERNMENT
Author(s) -
SUTTER DANIEL
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01744.x
Subject(s) - politics , leviathan (cipher) , economics , power (physics) , complement (music) , government (linguistics) , constitutional law , control (management) , law and economics , law , political science , computer science , biochemistry , chemistry , physics , linguistics , computer security , philosophy , management , quantum mechanics , complementation , gene , phenotype
I integrate constitutional constraints in a model of electoral control of politicians. Two types of politicians compete for office: angels, who never misuse power, and knaves, who abuse delegated power. Political theory suggests that constitutional constraints and elections are substitutes; I find a more complicated relationship. Elections sometimes substitute for constraints, while constraints complement and strengthen electoral controls based on politicians' payoffs. Elections must work perfectly to generally allow constraints to be dispensed with. Knaves might self‐select out of politics with constitutional constraints, which consequently appear inconsistent with the observed character of politicians. ( JEL H1, D72)