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BEHAVIORAL FOUNDATIONS OF RECIPROCITY: EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS AND EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY
Author(s) -
HOFFMAN ELIZABETH,
MCCABE KEVIN A.,
SMITH VER L.
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Book series
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
ISBN - 0-521-58450-7
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01719.x
Subject(s) - reciprocity (cultural anthropology) , strong reciprocity , economics , public good , evolutionary game theory , social preferences , microeconomics , evolutionary psychology , social exchange theory , property (philosophy) , experimental economics , game theory , mathematical economics , group (periodic table) , behavioral economics , dictator game , social psychology , psychology , non cooperative game , epistemology , philosophy , chemistry , organic chemistry
Laboratory experiments have generally supported the theorem that, in classical property rights environments, noncooperative behavior in markets yields efficient social outcomes. Experiments, however, regularly fail to support the game theoretic prediction of noncooperative behavior in small‐group strategic interaction and in large‐group public good environments. In these two types of experiments subjects frequently achieve more efficient social outcomes–they collect more money from the experimenter–than noncooperative game theory predicts. Many subjects in these experiments exhibit reciprocity even in single‐play games. Evolutionary psychologists hypothesize that humans have evolved mental algorithms for identifying and punishing cheaters in social exchange. ( JEL A11, A12, B41, C70, C72, C92)