Premium
THE EFFECT OF CONCEALED WEAPONS LAWS: AN EXTREME BOUND ANALYSIS
Author(s) -
BARTLEY WILLIAM ALAN,
COHEN MARK A.
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1998.tb01711.x
Subject(s) - deterrence (psychology) , substitution (logic) , economics , property (philosophy) , deterrence theory , econometrics , mathematical economics , law , law and economics , computer science , political science , philosophy , epistemology , programming language
Lott and Mustard [1997] provide evidence that enactment of concealed handgun (“right‐to‐carry”) laws deters violent crime and induces substitution into property crime. A critique by Black and Nagin [1998] questions the particular model specification used in the empirical analysis. In this paper, we estimate the “model uncertainty” surrounding the model specified by Lott and Mustard using an extreme bound analysis (Leamer [1983]). We find that the deterrence results are robust enough to make them difficult to dismiss as unfounded, particularly those findings about the change in violent crime trends. The substitution effects are not robust with respect to different model specifications. (JEL K42)