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GOVERNING A GROUNDWATER COMMONS: A STRATEGIC AND LABORATORY ANALYSIS OF WESTERN WATER LAW
Author(s) -
GARDNER ROY,
MOORE MICHAEL R.,
WALKER JAMES M.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1997.tb01905.x
Subject(s) - doctrine , groundwater , commons , appropriation , economics , subgame perfect equilibrium , law and economics , law , microeconomics , political science , nash equilibrium , linguistics , philosophy , geotechnical engineering , engineering
We examine strategic behavior in groundwater depletion within the setting of state governance of groundwater resources in the American West. Solving a dynamic common‐pool resource model for its optimal solution and its subgame perfect equilibrium provides benchmarks for behavior observed in laboratory experiments. Three forms of legal rules—common‐pool depletion with a “rule‐of‐capture” to establish ownership (absolute ownership doctrine), entry restrictions (prior appropriation doctrine), and stock quotas (correlative rights doctrine—are examined in terms of their impact on individual strategic behavior in laboratory experiments.