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THE BIASES OF FEDERAL RESERVE BANK PRESIDENTS
Author(s) -
HAVRILESKY THOMAS,
GILDEA JOHN
Publication year - 1995
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1995.tb01862.x
Subject(s) - open market operation , voting , federal reserve economic data , economics , quantitative easing , monetary policy , federal funds , excess reserves , monetary economics , monetary reform , political science , central bank , law , politics
This paper develops statistical tests which show that in Federal Open Market Committee voting, Federal Reserve bank presidents, as a group, prefer less expansionary monetary policy than Federal Reserve board members. Further tests show that a subset of Federal Reserve bank presidents vote in a manner which is consistent with the partisanship of the U.S. president during whose term they were appointed. Membership in this subset is highly correlated with a career as an economist. These results have implications for reforms which would alter the voting power of bank presidents on the FOMC.