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FIRM SPECIFIC HUMAN CAPITAL AS AN EMPLOYER DISCIPLINE DEVICE
Author(s) -
Laing Derek
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1994.tb01316.x
Subject(s) - human capital , moral hazard , economics , labour economics , unemployment , capital (architecture) , microeconomics , incentive , market economy , macroeconomics , history , archaeology
The inability of employers to monitor perfectly the level of effort of their employees is a potentially serious impediment to labor market efficacy. Indeed, a number of recent studies have concluded that this may lead to involuntary unemployment (Shapiro and Stiglitz [1984], Sparks [1986]); an inefficient sectoral allocation of workers (Oi [1990], Strand [1986]); and discrimination against productively identical workers (Bulow and Summers [1986]). This paper shows that the lock‐in effect of firm‐specific human capital can help alleviate problems of worker moral hazard and thereby promote labor market performance.