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VOTING AND IMITATIVE BEHAVIOR
Author(s) -
Nelson Phillip
Publication year - 1994
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1994.tb01314.x
Subject(s) - economics , voting , self interest , microeconomics , identification (biology) , function (biology) , voting behavior , politics , ethnic group , social psychology , psychology , political science , law , botany , evolutionary biology , biology
Political behavior generates private benefits by helping people fit in with desired friends. A voter imitates other voters, but at the same time they imitate him. An equilibrium solution requires exogenous variables: the narrow self‐interest of the participants. The reduced form makes one's vote a function of the narrow self‐interest of others as well as one's own. In accord with the model, a person's party identification depends on his ethnic group's current income and its income in 1909 as well as his own income.