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PRIVATE INTEREST SUPPORT FOR EFFICIENCY ENHANCING ANTITRUST POLICIES
Author(s) -
BUCHANAN JAMES M.,
LEE DWIGHT R.
Publication year - 1992
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01654.x
Subject(s) - legislation , competition (biology) , public interest , economics , government (linguistics) , law and economics , public economics , public interest theory , face (sociological concept) , law , political science , sociology , philosophy , biology , ecology , social science , linguistics
Recent discussions of antitrust based on the private interest theory of government conclude that the real, as opposed to the stated, purpose of antitrust legislation is to protect politically influential industries against competition. Yet several prominent antitrust scholars who accept the private interest theory of government in general see antitrust legislation serving the public interest by increasing competition. We argue that the private interest theory of government is consistent with the view that antitrust legislation promotes competition. Indeed antitrust legislation may be supported by organized interest groups because such legislation increases the competition they face.