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AN EXPRESSIVE VOTING THEORY OF STRIKES
Author(s) -
Glazer Amihai
Publication year - 1992
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01294.x
Subject(s) - voting , economics , contingent vote , law and economics , political science , group voting ticket , law , politics
Union members may vote for a strike even if they do not expect to thereby increase their wages. For under majority voting any one member's vote for a strike is unlikely to be decisive. A union member who obtains a non‐infinitesimal emotional benefit from the act of voting for a strike may therefore vote in its favor. This hypothesis can explain the existence of strikes and the conditions which make strikes especially likely.