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REAGANOMICS AND REPUTATION REVISITED
Author(s) -
Loewy Michael B.
Publication year - 1988
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1988.tb01492.x
Subject(s) - credibility , economics , reputation , monetary policy , keynesian economics , regime change , macroeconomics , fiscal policy , administration (probate law) , political science , law , politics , democracy
This paper considers a reformulation of Backus and Driffill's model of credibility following a change in regime. Following Tabellini, we alter their model to better fit macroeconomic policymaking as it is formulated in the U.S. where monetary and fiscal policies are made by independent policymakers. By assuming that policymakers of divergent views have recently entered office and so have no track record, the game's equilibrium corresponds to the U.S. experience during the first years of the Reagan administration.