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MANIPULATING VOTING PROCEDURES
Author(s) -
FELDMAN ALLAN
Publication year - 1979
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1979.tb00542.x
Subject(s) - condorcet method , voting , cardinal voting systems , anti plurality voting , bullet voting , approval voting , social choice theory , mathematical economics , outcome (game theory) , disapproval voting , arrow's impossibility theorem , ranked voting system , sketch , computer science , economics , political science , algorithm , law , politics
A voting procedure can be manipulated if, by misrepresenting his preferences, some individual can secure an outcome which he prefers to the outcome he gets when he is honest. This is an expository paper on the theory of voting manipulation. Section I is an historical sketch of the contributions of Condorcet, de Borda, Arrow, and others. Section II provides a set of examples of manipulation: of plurality voting, of majority voting, of exhaustive voting, of the single transferable vote procedure, and of approval voting. It also contains an example of a nonmanipulable random voting scheme. Section HI provides a simple proof of the Gibbard‐Satterthwaite manipulation theorem.