Premium
A DISEQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF A HIRING‐HALL LABOR MARKET
Author(s) -
KOPECKY KENNETH J.
Publication year - 1976
Publication title -
economic inquiry
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.823
H-Index - 72
eISSN - 1465-7295
pISSN - 0095-2583
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7295.1976.tb00388.x
Subject(s) - disequilibrium , economics , wage , notional amount , labour economics , secondary labor market , labor relations , medicine , finance , ophthalmology
This paper analyzes a labor market in which workers possess incomplete information about their exchange opportunities. Within this environment workers allocate time to the acquisition of job‐related information. Rules are specified determining where workers will seek employment and how firms will vary wages in response to workers' choices. Assuming a change in workers' notional labor supply, the paper then analyzes the dynamics of labor market disequilibrium. Two principal conclusions emerge: (1) Workers' time costs of acquiring information rise during disequilibrium. (2) In general the final wage differs from the wage that would prevail if a Walrasian auctioneer guided the labor market's adjustment.