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Does NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) Chapter 19 make a difference? Dispute settlement and the incentive structure of U.S./Canada unfair trade petitions
Author(s) -
Jones K.
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
contemporary economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.454
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1465-7287
pISSN - 1074-3529
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2000.tb00013.x
Subject(s) - enforcement , free trade agreement , incentive , international trade , settlement (finance) , economics , economic integration , trade barrier , international economics , free trade , business , law , political science , finance , payment , microeconomics
NAFTA Chapter 19 sets up bilateral review panels to replace the domestic judicial appeals process of resolving disputes among NAFTA members over the enforcement of unfair trade laws. In principle, such panels can change the incentive structure of filing unfair trade law petitions by reducing the likelihood of an affirmative finding of injurious unfair trade. Using data from U.S. and Canadian unfair trade petition filings, empirical tests show support for this hypothesis. However, a more comprehensive settlement of conflicts will require progressive legal integration, including an extension of national treatment measures to alleged “unfair trade” that is not currently envisaged under the NAFTA.