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IS THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE WORTHWHILE?
Author(s) -
OSBORNE EVAN
Publication year - 1999
Publication title -
contemporary economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.454
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1465-7287
pISSN - 1074-3529
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1999.tb00690.x
Subject(s) - misconduct , enforcement , exclusionary rule , compensation (psychology) , economics , principal (computer security) , deterrence (psychology) , law and economics , law enforcement , law , political science , psychology , computer security , supreme court , computer science , psychoanalysis
In the U.S. criminal courts must throw out improperly obtained evidence. A key justification for this practice is that it is that it deters law‐enforcement misconduct. This paper uses principal‐agent theory to suggest that, contrary to economic and other conventional wisdom, if the exclusionary rule is flawed it is because it deters inadequately rather than excessively. Principles of an optimal compensation scheme for law‐enforcement personnel are offered along with evidence suggesting that actual compensation does not reflect them. The rule may thus fail to sufficiently prevent misconduct even as it increases the costs from lost convictions. (JEL K14, K42, D82)