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PROPERTY RIGHTS, REGULATORY TAKING, AND COMPENSATION: IMPLICATIONS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
Author(s) -
GOLDSTEIN JON H.,
WATSON WILLIAM D.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
contemporary economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.454
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1465-7287
pISSN - 1074-3529
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1997.tb00487.x
Subject(s) - business , property rights , compensation (psychology) , liability , government (linguistics) , public economics , compliance (psychology) , just compensation , quality (philosophy) , law and economics , economics , finance , microeconomics , epistemology , psychology , psychoanalysis , social psychology , linguistics , philosophy
The 104th Congress considered several proposals requiring compensation for regulatory actions that diminish property values. Aimed primarily at weakening environmental protection, the bills focus on property rights independent of the public benefits from regulation. By significantly broadening the constitutional standard for compensation, the bills generate a government liability well in excess of compliance costs and thus discourage regulatory agencies from carrying out their mandates. The bills would increase transactions costs and undermine the efficient provision of environmental quality, public safety, and other public goods.