Premium
REGULATORY STRUCTURE, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND THE S& L DEBACLE
Author(s) -
Nelson RICHARD W.
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
contemporary economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.454
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1465-7287
pISSN - 1074-3529
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1993.tb00375.x
Subject(s) - deposit insurance , government regulation , incentive , business , regulatory reform , government (linguistics) , economics , finance , market economy , political science , law , linguistics , philosophy , china
Widespread S & L failures during the 1980s required the federal government to spend over 100 billion dollars bailing out the deposit insurance fund. This paper interprets the S & L debacle as a regulatory failure. Review of the S & L debacle suggests that regulators failed to manage the deposit insurance system efficiently. But the regulatory agencies' structure appears to have played a secondary role in contributing to regulatory failure. Faced with the same incentives, objectives, and resources, regulators probably would have behaved similarly regardless of the regulatory structure.