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HOW SHOULD BANK REGULATORY AGENCIES BE ORGANIZED?
Author(s) -
Shull BERNARD
Publication year - 1993
Publication title -
contemporary economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.454
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1465-7287
pISSN - 1074-3529
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1993.tb00374.x
Subject(s) - deposit insurance , treasury , consolidation (business) , business , regulatory agency , regulatory authority , agency (philosophy) , bank regulation , reserve requirement , financial system , finance , accounting , central bank , actuarial science , economics , monetary policy , public administration , monetary economics , political science , philosophy , welfare economics , epistemology , law
The U.S. Treasury Department (1991) makes a strong case for consolidating federal bank regulatory authority. However, its proposal to eliminate direct FDIC authority over insured nonmember banks contributes little to this end because deposit insurance requires supervisory oversight. The U.S. Treasury Department (1991) also maintains an independent role for the Federal Reserve. Elimination of neither the insurance agency nor the central bank appears practical. A better approach to regulatory agency consolidation would combine supervision with deposit insurance and central banking in an institutional structure modified somewhat from the present Federal Reserve structure.