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RISK TAKING BY THRIFT INSTITUTIONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION
Author(s) -
GOLBE DEVRA L.,
SHULL BERNARD
Publication year - 1991
Publication title -
contemporary economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.454
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1465-7287
pISSN - 1074-3529
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1991.tb00346.x
Subject(s) - insolvency , diversification (marketing strategy) , closure (psychology) , economics , actuarial science , asset (computer security) , business , finance , computer security , marketing , computer science , market economy
The discussion surrounding the recent reregulation of the thrift industry suggests that (i) thrifts engaging in “risky” activities are more likely to become insolvent and that (ii) thrifts already near insolvency are likely to take on more risks resulting in increased loss. This paper considers the relationship between insolvency and risk taking in a simultaneous framework and uses 1978–1983 data for Illinois thrifts to investigate the relationship. The paper explores the likelihood that risk taking by thrifts increases as the probability of insolvency increases, that risk taking increases as the probability of failure (i.e., closure by the regulator) increases, and that the probability of insolvency increases as risk taking increases. Preliminary empirical results suggest that an increase in the probability of insolvency increases risk taking and that an increase in risk taking increases the likelihood of insolvency. This latter result is (statistically) significant only when one measures risk by an index of diversification. If sustained in more extensive testing, this result implies that regulatory restrictions on asset diversification are counterproductive.