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ARMS NEGOTIATIONS, THE SOVIET ECONOMY, AND DEMOCRATICALLY INDUCED DELUSIONS
Author(s) -
LEE DWIGHT R.
Publication year - 1986
Publication title -
contemporary economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.454
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1465-7287
pISSN - 1074-3529
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1986.tb00854.x
Subject(s) - negotiation , soviet union , arms control , incentive , economics , politics , political economy , political science , arms race , faith , economic system , market economy , law , philosophy , theology
It is widely assumed that weak economic performance in the Soviet Union provides motivation for Soviet leaders to pursue arms negotiations in good faith. This paper argues that the reality is quite the opposite. For both political and economic considerations, the weak economy of the Soviet Union generates incentives for the Soviets to use arms control negotiations to achieve military advantages rather than to limit arms.