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MOTIVATIONS FOR HOSTILE TENDER OFFERS AND THE MARKET FOR POLITICAL EXCHANGE
Author(s) -
POULSEN ANNETTE B.,
JARRELL GREGG A.
Publication year - 1986
Publication title -
contemporary economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.454
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1465-7287
pISSN - 1074-3529
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1986.tb00847.x
Subject(s) - tender offer , shareholder , market for corporate control , politics , business , point (geometry) , control (management) , economics , corporate governance , finance , monetary economics , accounting , law , management , geometry , mathematics , political science
This paper reviews the arguments concerning the role of hostile tender offers in today's corporate world. Some observers suggest that “corporate raiders” do not pay shareholders a fair price for their holdings and that they disrupt firms' day‐to‐day operations. Others point to the significant premiums paid to shareholders in tender offers, and they suggest that raiders play an important role in forcing changes in corporations. The paper also presents the authors' views on the viability of proposed regulations in the corporate control area.