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A MANDATE OF PRICE STABILITY FOR THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
Author(s) -
HETZEL ROBERT L.
Publication year - 1985
Publication title -
contemporary economic policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.454
H-Index - 49
eISSN - 1465-7287
pISSN - 1074-3529
DOI - 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1985.tb00822.x
Subject(s) - discretion , mandate , economics , monetary policy , price of stability , macroeconomics , public economics , monetary economics , law , political science
In recent years, the rules‐versus‐discretion debate over monetary policy has taken on new life. In the 1960s, this debate focused on the relative merits of nonactivist policies versus activist stabilization policies. When rational expectations arguments emerged in the 1970s, the debate broadened into three categories: activist policies characterized by rules, activist policies characterized by discretion, and nonactivist policies characterized by rules. This paper presents arguments for a particular example of the latter of these policies…specifically, a monetary policy which accords preeminence to achieving price‐level stability. Central to these arguments is a comparison of this hypothetical policy with the actual monetary policy pursued by the Federal Reserve System, which is a type of activist policy characterized by discretion. The comparison suggests that actual monetary policy is more constrained than is generally realized. A rule mandating that the Federal Reserve accord preeminence to achieving price‐level stability, then, should not be regarded as a policy which would significantly increase constraints on monetary policy. Instead, such a rule should be regarded as replacing implicit, poorly understood constraints with explicit constraints.