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Evolution and persistence of obligate mutualists and exploiters: competition for partners and evolutionary immunization
Author(s) -
Ferrière Régis,
Gauduchon Mathias,
Bronstein Judith L.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
ecology letters
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 6.852
H-Index - 265
eISSN - 1461-0248
pISSN - 1461-023X
DOI - 10.1111/j.1461-0248.2006.01008.x
Subject(s) - mutualism (biology) , obligate , biology , ecology , competition (biology) , cheating , evolutionary biology , natural selection , evolutionary ecology , evolutionarily stable strategy , host (biology) , game theory , selection (genetic algorithm) , economics , microeconomics , artificial intelligence , computer science
Mutualisms are ubiquitous in nature, as is their exploitation by both conspecific and heterospecific cheaters. Yet, evolutionary theory predicts that cheating should be favoured by natural selection. Here, we show theoretically that asymmetrical competition for partners generally determines the evolutionary fate of obligate mutualisms facing exploitation by third‐species invaders. When asymmetry in partner competition is relatively weak, mutualists may either exclude exploiters or coexist with them, in which case their co‐evolutionary response to exploitation is usually benign. When asymmetry is strong, the mutualists evolve towards evolutionary attractors where they become extremely vulnerable to exploiter invasion. However, exploiter invasion at an early stage of the mutualism's history can deflect mutualists’ co‐evolutionary trajectories towards slightly different attractors that confer long‐term stability against further exploitation. Thus, coexistence of mutualists and exploiters may often involve an historical effect whereby exploiters are co‐opted early in mutualism history and provide lasting ‘evolutionary immunization’ against further invasion.