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Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm
Author(s) -
Linnemer Laurent
Publication year - 2003
Publication title -
journal of economics and management strategy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.672
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1530-9134
pISSN - 1058-6407
DOI - 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2003.00231.x
Subject(s) - cournot competition , downstream (manufacturing) , marginal cost , competition (biology) , economics , microeconomics , vertical integration , production (economics) , welfare , economic surplus , bertrand competition , industrial organization , bertrand paradox (economics) , constant (computer programming) , market economy , oligopoly , operations management , ecology , computer science , biology , programming language
This paper studies the welfare consequences of a vertical merger that raises rivals' costs when downstream competition is a la Cournot between firms with constant asymmetric marginal costs. The main result is that such a vertical merger can nevertheless improve welfare if it involves a downstream firm whose cost is low enough. This is because by raising the input price paid by the nonmerging firms the merger shifts production away from those relatively inefficient producers in favor of the more efficient firm. Yet, there is a trade‐off between the gain in productive efficiency and the loss in consumers' surplus caused by the higher downstream price that follows a higher input price. It is also shown, through an example, that this result extends to price competition with differentiated products.