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Patent Licensing Under Strategic Delegation
Author(s) -
Saracho Ana I.
Publication year - 2002
Publication title -
journal of economics and management strategy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.672
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1530-9134
pISSN - 1058-6407
DOI - 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2002.00225.x
Subject(s) - corporation , delegation , incentive , corporate governance , business , agency (philosophy) , accounting , industrial organization , strategic management , principal–agent problem , law and economics , management , marketing , economics , finance , market economy , philosophy , epistemology
The modern corporation is characterized both by a separation of ownership from management and by managerial incentives that often include strategic elements in addition to the standard incentive elements. Despite the importance of these two features in the agency and corporate‐governance literatures, they are absent in the treatment of the firm in the patent‐licensing literature. The analysis in this paper shows how, by simply taking into account these two features of the modern corporation, it is possible to offer a new explanation for the use of royalties in licensing agreements.