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Systems Competition, Vertical Merger, and Foreclosure
Author(s) -
Church Jeffrey,
Gandal Neil
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
journal of economics and management strategy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.672
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1530-9134
pISSN - 1058-6407
DOI - 10.1111/j.1430-9134.2000.00025.x
Subject(s) - foreclosure , software , competition (biology) , industrial organization , compatibility (geochemistry) , business , computer science , microeconomics , economics , finance , operating system , engineering , biology , ecology , chemical engineering
We address the possibility of foreclosure in markets where the final good consists of a system composed of a hardware good and complementary software and the value of the system depends on the availability of software. Foreclosure occurs when a hardware firm merges with a software firm and the integrated firm makes its software incompatible with a rival technology or system. We find that foreclosure can be an equilibrium outcome where both the merger and compatibility decisions are part of a multistage game which permits the foreclosed hardware firm to play a number of counter‐strategies. Further, foreclosure can be an effective strategy to monopolize the hardware market.