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Agency‐Theory and Internal‐Labor‐Market Explanations of Bonus Payments: Empirical Evidence from Spanish Firms
Author(s) -
OrtínÁngel Pedro,
Salasfumás Vicente
Publication year - 1998
Publication title -
journal of economics and management strategy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.672
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1530-9134
pISSN - 1058-6407
DOI - 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1998.00573.x
Subject(s) - incentive , agency (philosophy) , payment , principal–agent problem , promotion (chess) , empirical evidence , compensation (psychology) , sample (material) , agency cost , labour economics , economics , executive compensation , term (time) , microeconomics , business , finance , psychology , corporate governance , philosophy , chemistry , physics , epistemology , chromatography , quantum mechanics , politics , political science , psychoanalysis , law , shareholder
This paper combines agency theory and internal‐labor‐market theories to explain the determinants of bonus payments among a large sample of top and middle managers from Spanish firms. A distinction is made between the decision whether to pay bonus or not and the size of the bonus. The empirical evidence confirms that the two decisions are determined by different factors. The results of the analysis show a trade‐off between short‐term and long‐term incentives (bonuses and promotion opportunities) as well as differences in the pattern of compensation policies across economic sectors and functional areas inside the firm.