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Making More from Less: Strategic Demand Reduction in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Author(s) -
Weber Robert J.
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
journal of economics and management strategy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.672
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1530-9134
pISSN - 1058-6407
DOI - 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00529.x
Subject(s) - common value auction , spectrum auction , reduction (mathematics) , forward auction , english auction , business , microeconomics , broadband , demand reduction , unique bid auction , economics , computer science , auction theory , telecommunications , revenue equivalence , mathematics , medicine , pathology , geometry
When multiple items are sold through the use of simultaneous ascending‐bid auctions, bidders can find it in their mutual interests to reduce their aggregate demand for the items while prices are still low relative to the bidders' valuations. The FCC's first broadband PCS auction provides examples of how such mutual reductions might be arranged even when the bidders are not allowed to communicate with one another outside of the auction arena.