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Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition
Author(s) -
GalOr Esther
Publication year - 1997
Publication title -
journal of economics and management strategy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.672
H-Index - 68
eISSN - 1530-9134
pISSN - 1058-6407
DOI - 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00235.x
Subject(s) - agency (philosophy) , competition (biology) , product (mathematics) , agency cost , product market , market competition , microeconomics , industrial organization , principal–agent problem , work (physics) , business , economics , market economy , finance , engineering , mathematics , mechanical engineering , ecology , corporate governance , philosophy , geometry , epistemology , biology , incentive , shareholder
This paper surveys recent work in contract theory that relates to the allocation of tasks among agents within an organization as well as to the effect of product market competition upon optimal contracting and agency costs.