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Implications of Regulation Policy Incentives for Strategic Control: An Integrative Model
Author(s) -
Chau Vinh Sum,
Witcher Barry J.
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
annals of public and cooperative economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.526
H-Index - 37
eISSN - 1467-8292
pISSN - 1370-4788
DOI - 10.1111/j.1370-4788.2005.00272.x
Subject(s) - incentive , strategic control , principal–agent problem , control (management) , principal (computer security) , business , agency (philosophy) , management control system , industrial organization , monopoly , strategic planning , economics , strategic thinking , corporate governance , marketing , microeconomics , management , finance , computer science , philosophy , epistemology , operating system
** :This paper proposes an internal management perspective of the company, as a complement to longstanding principal‐agency theory, for understanding the interchange between regulator and company. It draws from a longitudinal research project on understanding the implications of regulation policy incentives for strategic control in the management of UK monopoly network utilities and the management implications of regulatory policy making. This paper reports on how two utility companies have managed regulatory objectives alongside organizational ones in electricity distribution and gas transportation and suggests a new integrative model of strategic control for understanding utility management. It concludes if regulation policies are to be effective then regulators should understand the internal management of the companies if performance targets are to be attained .