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Ce que vous ne voyez pas ne peut pas vous faire de tort: une analyse économique des lois de moralité.
Author(s) -
Curry Philip A.,
Mongrain Steeve
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1365-2966.2008.00476.x
Subject(s) - discretion , morality , sanctions , externality , incentive , consumption (sociology) , economics , law and economics , microeconomics , law , political science , sociology , social science
. This paper provides an efficiency explanation for regulation of sex, drugs, and gambling. We propose that these ‘morality laws’ can be explained by considering some activities to impose a negative externality when the activity is observed . Efficiency requires discretion by the individual who engages in such activities. When discretion is difficult to regulate directly, the activities can instead be proscribed, thereby giving individuals incentive to hide their actions from others. We find conditions for the first‐best levels of consumption and hiding to be implementable. Since some level of activity is efficient, the optimal sanctions are not maximal.