Premium
Protection individuelle par rapport aux crimes contre la propriété: décomposition des effets de l'observabilité de la protection.
Author(s) -
Hotte Louis,
Van Ypersele Tanguy
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1365-2966.2008.00474.x
Subject(s) - unobservable , observability , stochastic game , observable , externality , economics , property (philosophy) , unit (ring theory) , microeconomics , econometrics , mathematics , philosophy , physics , mathematics education , epistemology , quantum mechanics
. We re‐examine the efficiency of observable and unobservable crime protection decisions with new results and insights. Observable protection is unambiguously associated with a negative externality. At the individual level, it reduces the crime effort, but its unit payoff remains unchanged. Conversely, unobservable protection reduces the unit payoff and has no effect on the crime effort exerted, though it deters crime globally. A decrease in the global crime payoff is detrimental to a victim if protection is observable, while it is beneficial when unobservable. While observable protection has a positive diversion effect, it has the opposite effect when unobservable.