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Guerre bilatérale dans un monde multilatéral: carottes et bâtons aux fins de résolution de conflit.
Author(s) -
Becsi and Sajal Lahiri Zsolt
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1365-2966.2007.00447.x
Subject(s) - incentive , conflict resolution , economics , welfare , nash equilibrium , resolution (logic) , globalization , international conflict , political economy , development economics , world war ii , political science , international trade , international economics , microeconomics , market economy , law , computer science , artificial intelligence , politics
. This paper constructs a three‐country, specific‐factor, trade‐theoretic model in which two of the countries are in conflict and where war effort is determined endogenously in a Nash equilibrium. The third country does not take part in the war, but trades with the warring countries. In the framework, we examine, inter alia, how war and welfare are affected by globalization and by two instruments available to the third country – one carrot and one stick. Our overall conclusion is that the third parties do have the incentives for, and can play an effective role in, conflict resolution. JEL classification: F02, F11, H56, H77