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Leadership fiscal et plan de la banque centrale .
Author(s) -
Hallett Andrew Hughes,
Weymark Dia.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1365-2966.2007.00423.x
Subject(s) - inflation (cosmology) , economics , government (linguistics) , fiscal policy , monetary policy , monetary economics , central bank , central government , macroeconomics , political science , local government , public administration , philosophy , linguistics , physics , theoretical physics
. This article investigates the impact, on economic performance, of the timing of moves in a policy game between the government and the central bank for a government that has both redistributional and stabilization objectives. It is shown that both inflation and income inequality are reduced without sacrificing output growth if the government assumes a leadership role compared with a regime in which monetary and fiscal policy are determined simultaneously. Further, it is shown that government leadership benefits both the fiscal and monetary authorities through the enhanced coordination that this arrangement implies.