Premium
A propos de la possibilité de généraliser les comportements de laboratoire à ce qui se passe sur le terrain .
Author(s) -
Levitt Steven D.,
List John A.
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
canadian journal of economics/revue canadienne d'économique
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.773
H-Index - 69
eISSN - 1540-5982
pISSN - 0008-4085
DOI - 10.1111/j.1365-2966.2007.00412.x
Subject(s) - generalizability theory , class (philosophy) , field (mathematics) , economics , positive economics , psychology , epistemology , social psychology , mathematics , philosophy , developmental psychology , pure mathematics
. We can think of no question more fundamental to experimental economics than understanding whether, and under what circumstances, laboratory results generalize to naturally occurring environments. In this paper, we extend Levitt and List (2006) to the class of games in which financial payoffs and ‘doing the right thing’ are not necessarily in conflict. We argue that behaviour is crucially linked to not only the preferences of people, but also the properties of the situation. By doing so, we are able to provide a road map of the psychological and economic properties of people and situations that might interfere with generalizability of laboratory result from a broad class of games.