Philosophy of science underpinnings of prototype validation: Popper vs. Quine

.  In this paper, we aim to provide prototype validation in both custom and packaged software development with a theoretical framework located within the philosophy of science. Towards that end, we consider Popperian and Quinean accounts of scientific knowledge and argue that the theoretical underpinning of prototype validation is Quine’s holistic philosophy of science, whose cornerstone principle is that all beliefs are revisable. Specifically, our thesis is that the systems developer and software consumer (user or customer) join forces – not as Popperian falsifiers, who make a decision rule to reject the prototype on account of any divergence, major or minor, from the software consumer’s mental model, but – as Quinean revisers, with the objective of fine‐tuning the prototype (or the software consumer’s mental model) so that the prototype and the software consumer’s mental model are congruent with each other. This paper suggests that prototype revisions are belief revisions, and, as such, should be guided – and are guided – by pragmatic norms, such as conservatism, simplicity and generality, and are influenced by social, or sociological, factors as well. Finally, we discuss the relevance, value and pragmatic implications of a Quinean philosophy of science framework for research and practice.