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Origins, taxa, names and meanings
Author(s) -
Rieppel Olivier
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
cladistics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 2.323
H-Index - 92
eISSN - 1096-0031
pISSN - 0748-3007
DOI - 10.1111/j.1096-0031.2007.00195.x
Subject(s) - essentialism , taxon , epistemology , metaphysics , genealogy , context (archaeology) , evolutionary biology , philosophy , sociology , geography , biology , ecology , history , paleontology
Animal and plant taxonomy is neither a department of linguistics, nor for that matter of metaphysics, but a department of empirical biology. (Hanna and Harrison, 2004, p. 260). In a recent contribution, Ereshefsky (2007a) maintained the following points against Nixon and Carpenter (2000), Keller et al . (2003), and Rieppel (2005a, 2006a,b): (1) that species and taxa are individuals, not natural kinds; (2) that “origin essentialism” conflates qualitative essentialism with genealogical connectedness; and (3) that rigid designation theory applies to taxon names. Here I argue that: (1) the conception of species as individuals or natural kinds is not mutually exclusive but rather context sensitive; species are best seen as spatio‐temporally located processual systems that instantiate an HPC natural kind; (2) “origin essentialism” is problematic because of the fuzzy boundaries of species and taxa, yet required if rigid designation theory is to apply to taxon names; and (3) the theories of direct reference and rigid designation do not apply to taxon names. © The Willi Hennig Society 2008.