Turning the Trolley

The trolley problem is by now thoroughly familiar, but it pays to begin with a description of its origins. In “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect,” Philippa Foot described a variety of hypothetical cases, in some of which we regard it as permissible for the agent to act, in others of which we regard it as impermissible for the agent to act, and she asked the good question what explains the differences among our verdicts about them. Her aim was to assess whether the Doctrine of Double Effect provides a plausible answer. She concluded that it doesn’t, and went on to offer an answer of her own. It is her own answer that will interest us. Here are two of her hypothetical cases. In the first, which I will call Judge’s Two Options, a crime has been committed, and some rioters have taken five innocent people hostage; they will kill the five unless the judge arranges for the trial, followed by the execution, of the culprit. The real culprit is unknown, however. So the judge has only two options: