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T he T hird O ption in I raq : A R esponsible E xit S trategy
Author(s) -
Porter Gareth
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
middle east policy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.177
H-Index - 27
eISSN - 1475-4967
pISSN - 1061-1924
DOI - 10.1111/j.1061-1924.2005.00211.x
Subject(s) - dominance (genetics) , negotiation , citation , political science , foreign policy , power (physics) , history , economic history , law , politics , biochemistry , chemistry , physics , quantum mechanics , gene
The U.S. military occupation of Iraq is the subject of a political stalemate at home, despite its lack of public support. A CNN/ USA Today/Gallup Poll survey in mid-June showed that 59 percent said they opposed “the U.S. war with Iraq,” while only 39 percent said they favored it. Even more significant, the percentage opposing war with Iraq had increased by 21 points since mid-March. A Harris Poll taken in June revealed that 63 percent of the sample favored bringing “most of our troops home in the next year,” while only 33 percent favored waiting until a “stable government” had been established in Iraq. This popular opposition to continued occupation might be dangerous for the administration, but two factors tend to muffle its political impact. First, the divide in the country is highly partisan: Republicans still support the president by a 3-to-1 margin; while Democrats disapprove 7-to-1 and independents 2-to-1. This gives a Republican president plenty of room for maneuver.1 Movement toward an exit strategy, moreover, is still resisted by a large majority of the political elite. In the first clear test, on May 26, an amendment calling on President Bush to devise a plan for withdrawal from Iraq was defeated in the House of Representatives 300 to 128. Thus Congress is far more supportive of a long occupation than is the populace. This has enabled the Bush administration to act as though it were immune to the polling data, declaring that it has a “victory strategy” rather than an “exit strategy.” The wide gap between public opinion and the split in Congress on Iraq is in large part the result of a failed national discourse on Iraq. The political elite now have only two choices: either to set a unilateral timetable for troop withdrawal or to give the administration unlimited time to build adequate Iraqi security forces to replace U.S. troops – and to determine when they are adequate. This stark choice has left even most opponents of the initial invasion willing to tolerate the administration’s policy of indefinite occupation, because of their fear of the unknown consequences of a defeat for U.S. policy in both Iraq and