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Kant and Nonconceptual Content
Author(s) -
Hanna Robert
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/j.0966-8373.2005.00229.x
Subject(s) - content (measure theory) , encyclopedia , philosophy , citation , library science , computer science , mathematics , linguistics , mathematical analysis
The informational states which a subject acquires through perception are non-conceptual, or non-conceptualized. Judgements based upon such states necessarily involve conceptualization: in moving from a perceptual experience to a judgement about the world (usually expressible in some verbal form), one will be exercising basic conceptual skills. But this formulation (in terms of moving from an experience to a judgement) must not be allowed to obscure the general picture. Although the judgments are based upon his experience (i.e. upon the unconceptualized information available to to him), his judgements are not about the informational state. The process of conceptualization or judgment takes the subject from his being in one kind of informational state (with a content of a certain kind, namely, non-conceptual content) to his being in another kind of cognitive state (with a content of a different kind, namely, conceptual content). (Evans 1982: 227)