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Being in Others: Empathy From a Psychoanalytical Perspective
Author(s) -
Richmond Sarah
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
european journal of philosophy
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.42
H-Index - 36
eISSN - 1468-0378
pISSN - 0966-8373
DOI - 10.1111/j.0966-8373.2004.00209.x
Subject(s) - empathy , perspective (graphical) , psychology , psychoanalysis , philosophy , epistemology , social psychology , computer science , artificial intelligence
'No longer to think of oneself'.—let us reflect seriously upon this question: why do we leap after someone who has fallen into the water in front of us, even though we feel no kind of affection for him? Out of pity: at that moment we are thinking only of the other person—thus says thoughtlessness. Why do we feel pain and discomfort in common with someone spitting blood, though we may even be ill-disposed towards him? Out of pity: at that moment we are not thinking of ourself—thus says the same thoughtlessness. The truth is: in the feeling of pity—I mean in that which is usually and misleadingly called pity—we are, to be sure, not consciously thinking of oneself but are doing so very strongly unconsciouslyyAn accident which happens to another offends us: it would make us aware of our impotence, and perhaps of our cowardice, if we did not go to assist him. Or it brings with it in itself a diminution of our honour in the eyes of others or in our own eyes. Or an accident and suffering incurred by another constitutes a signpost to some danger to us; and it can have a painful effect upon us simply as a token of human vulnerability and fragility in general. (Nietzsche 1881: §133) Iycame to recognize the major importance for identification of certain projective mechanisms which are complementary to the introjective ones. The process which underlies the feeling of identification with other people, because one has attributed qualities or attitudes of one's own to them, was generally taken for granted even before the corresponding concept was incorporated in psycho- analytic theory. For instance, the projective mechanism underlying empathy is familiar in everyday life. (Klein 1955: 142-3) We are inclined to attribute to other people—in a sense, to put into them—some of our own emotions and thoughtsyBy attributing part of our feelings to the other person, we understand their feelings, needs and satisfactions; in other words, we are putting ourselves into the other person's shoes. There are people who go so far in this direction that they lose themselves entirely in others and become incapable of objective judgement. (Klein 1959: 252-3)