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SIGNALING THROUGH POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: ELECTIONS AS A REVELATION MECHANISM
Author(s) -
Roumanias Costas
Publication year - 2005
Publication title -
economics and politics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.822
H-Index - 45
eISSN - 1468-0343
pISSN - 0954-1985
DOI - 10.1111/j.0954-1985.2005.00158.x
Subject(s) - revelation , politics , principal (computer security) , competition (biology) , mechanism (biology) , interpretation (philosophy) , political science , law and economics , political economy , economics , law , computer science , computer security , epistemology , ecology , philosophy , biology , programming language , art , literature
Political campaigns are usually seen either as a way of passing information about candidates' intended policies to the voters or as a political liability of the candidates towards the interest groups that finance them. We provide a different interpretation of political campaigns using a political competition model for campaign promises and spending. In a principal–agent framework, elections are shown to be a truth revelation mechanism, in which the principal (voters) induces truthful revelation of ability by the agent (candidates). Campaign promises and spending coexist as an integral part of this mechanism. Political competition is then derived endogenously.