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Self‐Regulatory Trajectories in the Shadow of Public Power: Resolving Digital Dilemmas in Europe and the United States
Author(s) -
Newman Abraham L.,
Bach David
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
governance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.46
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1468-0491
pISSN - 0952-1895
DOI - 10.1111/j.0952-1895.2004.00251.x
Subject(s) - shadow (psychology) , european union , regulatory authority , power (physics) , action (physics) , collective action , member states , business , economics , political science , public administration , international trade , law , politics , psychology , physics , quantum mechanics , psychotherapist
Although industry self‐regulation has developed into a preferred regulatory strategy for the digital economy, self‐regulatory solutions adopted in the U.S. and the European Union differ considerably. We argue that variation in the shadow of public power—the public sector tools employed to induce industry collective action—sets the two on distinct self‐regulatory trajectories. Legalistic self‐regulation dominates in the U.S. and coordinated self‐regulation in Europe. Expectations derived from the model are evaluated in case studies of online content regulation and personal data privacy protection.