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Feeling the Heat? Anticorruption Mechanisms in Comparative Perspective
Author(s) -
Maor Moshe
Publication year - 2004
Publication title -
governance
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 1.46
H-Index - 76
eISSN - 1468-0491
pISSN - 0952-1895
DOI - 10.1111/j.0952-1895.2004.00235.x
Subject(s) - politics , mandate , credibility , political science , government (linguistics) , feeling , power (physics) , political economy , language change , perspective (graphical) , public administration , control (management) , public relations , law , sociology , economics , management , social psychology , psychology , artificial intelligence , computer science , art , philosophy , linguistics , physics , literature , quantum mechanics
This article addresses the implications of political executives losing control over corruption investigations of senior officeholders following the creation of anticorruption mechanisms (e.g., commissions, special prosecutors, independent counsels, investigating judges). When investigations hit close to home, the ensuing political fallout makes political executives eager to look for ways to derail such investigations, especially when investigators proceed with an uncharted mandate. Against this background, two hypotheses are investigated: (i) the striking outcome of this process is a concerted move by targeted political executives to undermine the credibility of anticorruption mechanisms and, when deemed necessary, to terminate their operation, and (ii) the extent to which the prosecutors are successful depends on both institutions and media accessibility: the more centralized and fused political power is, and the less media accessible the government is, the harder it will be to carry out an investigation. These hypotheses are strongly supported by a comparative analysis of five anticorruption mechanisms in the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Australia (Queensland and New South Wales.)