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The rules of standard‐setting organizations: an empirical analysis
Author(s) -
Chiao Benjamin,
Lerner Josh,
Tirole Jean
Publication year - 2007
Publication title -
the rand journal of economics
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 3.687
H-Index - 108
eISSN - 1756-2171
pISSN - 0741-6261
DOI - 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2007.00118.x
Subject(s) - work (physics) , test (biology) , quality (philosophy) , business , industrial organization , accounting , marketing , engineering , mechanical engineering , paleontology , philosophy , epistemology , biology
This article empirically explores standard‐setting organizations' policy choices. Consistent with our earlier theoretical work, we find (i) a negative relationship between the extent to which an SSO is oriented to technology sponsors and the concession level required of sponsors and (ii) a positive correlation between the sponsor friendliness of the selected SSO and the quality of the standard. We also develop and test two extensions of the earlier model: the presence of provisions mandating royalty‐free licensing is negatively associated with disclosure requirements, and the relationship between concessions and user friendliness is weaker when there is only a limited number of SSOs.