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The Law : Litigating the War Power with Campbell v. Clinton
Author(s) -
FISHER LOUIS
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
presidential studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.337
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 1741-5705
pISSN - 0360-4918
DOI - 10.1111/j.0360-4918.2000.00129.x
Subject(s) - presidential system , law , political science , power (physics) , acquiescence , presidency , constitution , politics , impeachment , legislature , executive power , physics , quantum mechanics
Presidential war power has expanded because of executive initiatives, congressional acquiescence, and judicial passivity. This article takes a look at the traditional role of courts in serving as an independent check on presidential war power. During the past half century, however, judges have increasingly invoked a number of doctrines to avoid deciding war power cases: standing, mootness, ripeness, political questions, and prudential considerations. This pattern culminates in Congressman Tom Campbell's challenge to President Bill Clinton's war in Yugoslavia, a case that failed on a combination of standing and political questions. The net effect of this legislative and judicial performance is that we now have unchecked presidential wars, a condition that would have astonished the framers of the Constitution.

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