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Fiscal Policy and Presidential Elections: Update and Extension
Author(s) -
CUZÁN ALFRED G.,
BUNDRICK CHARLES M.
Publication year - 2000
Publication title -
presidential studies quarterly
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.337
H-Index - 5
eISSN - 1741-5705
pISSN - 0360-4918
DOI - 10.1111/j.0360-4918.2000.00112.x
Subject(s) - presidential system , presidency , political science , fiscal policy , extension (predicate logic) , politics , political economy , economics , keynesian economics , law , computer science , programming language
This article updates, deepens, and extends previous articles published in this journal on the relation between fiscal policy and presidential elections. It presents evidence that is consistent with the view that voters reward fiscal frugality and punish fiscal expansion. The relationship is robust with respect to economic conditions, presidential incumbency, number of consecutive terms in the White House by presidents of the same party, and war. An intriguing finding is that, when fiscal policy is controlled for, incumbency advantage practically disappears. It is hoped that these findings will stimulate more political scientists, especially students of the presidency, to pay more attention to the role of fiscal policy in presidential elections.