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WELFARE IN THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN EXPORT TAXES UNDER BERTRAND DUOPOLY
Author(s) -
Clarke Roger,
Collie David R.
Publication year - 2008
Publication title -
bulletin of economic research
Language(s) - English
Resource type - Journals
SCImago Journal Rank - 0.227
H-Index - 29
eISSN - 1467-8586
pISSN - 0307-3378
DOI - 10.1111/j.0307-3378.2008.00273.x
Subject(s) - economics , duopoly , grossman , nash equilibrium , bertrand competition , microeconomics , welfare , keynesian economics , cournot competition , oligopoly , market economy
ABSTRACT In the Eaton and Grossman Quarterly Journal of Economics , 101 (1986), pp. 383–406 model of export taxes under Bertrand duopoly, it is shown that welfare in the Nash equilibrium in export taxes is always higher than welfare under free trade for both countries.

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